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F THE 1970s television series “Dallas” were recast in the 1990s,
J. R. Ewing’s fortune would likely come from a high-tech start-up
rather than an oil inheritance. Dallas’ Texas Instruments, Austin’s
Dell Computer and Houston’s Compaq make the most technology-
related headlines. However, Texas boasts hundreds of high-tech
firms employing about 341,000 workers—second only to Cali-
fornia’s 742,200 high-tech workers and followed by 306,300 in New
York, according to the American Electronics Association.
1
Despite Austin’s image as Texas’ high-tech Mecca, North Texas has
the largest number of high-tech jobs in the state. Dallas/Fort Worth’s
230,000 high-tech workers place the region among the ranks of Cali-
fornia’s Silicon Valley in terms of employment. According to the
Texas Workforce Commission, most high-tech workers in the North
Texas area are employed in the telecommunications industry.
As illustrated in Table 1, nearly half of Texas’ 129,131 telecom jobs
are in the Dallas area.
2 In fact, Richardson’s “Telecom Corridor” is
home to the largest concentration of telecom firms in the world—
more than 600 within two square miles.
3 However, the industry spills
out beyond the borders of the Telecom Corridor and accounts for
I
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A CASESTUDYINAGGLOMERATION3.52 percent of all employment in Dal-
las. This is more than double telecom-
munications’ share of employment in
Austin and San Antonio.
This article takes a look at the tele-
communications industry that has 
clustered, or “agglomerated,” in North
Texas. The telecom industry’s high con-
centration in North Texas means that
firms are located quite close to their
competitors. We focus on the relation-
ships between the area’s telecom com-
panies and the benefits the firms derive
from choosing a common location for
their businesses.
Telecom in Texas
The Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
informally surveyed telecom businesses
in and around Richardson’s Telecom Cor-
ridor. These companies account for most
of Dallas’ 62,741 telecom jobs. Our ques-
tions addressed five topics: corporate
function at the national and regional
levels, motivation for locating in North
Texas, regional employment, relationships
with other companies and customer
base. The results are tabulated in Table 2.
The survey revealed two striking
characteristics of North Texas’ telecom
industry. First, an extensive mix of ser-
vice and manufacturing firms has set-
tled in the area, and second, telecom
firms have a strong tendency to locate
their headquarters in the North Texas
region.
The principal lines of business for
telecom firms are (1) providing long-
distance, local and wireless communi-
cations for businesses and individuals;
(2) operating networks for voice and
data, wired and wireless transmissions;
(3) building and designing physical in-
frastructure for operators; and (4) man-
ufacturing equipment ranging from 
cell phone handsets and fax machines
for consumers to the fiber-optic cable,
satellites and switches that form net-
works. Individual telecom firms usually
engage in more than one of these prin-
cipal lines of business, but can be
roughly categorized into service and
manufacturing firms. According to our
survey, Nortel, Alcatel and Lucent Tech-
nologies are the largest equipment
manufacturers in the area, while GTE
dominates service provision in terms of
employment.
Our survey also indicates the preva-
lence of international, U.S. and func-
tional-level headquarters in North Texas.
Many respondent firms have parent
companies in Europe, Asia and other
parts of North America. Nevertheless,
telecom companies are not simply
opening regional offices in North Texas.
They are bringing their headquarters to
the area. When survey respondents
were asked why they chose to locate in
North Texas, one of the most common
answers was to be closer to other tele-
com firms.




Total Telecom as a percent as a percent of
Area employment employment of employment Texas telecom
Texas 8,677,968 129,131 1.49 100
Dallas 1,781,909 62,741 3.52 49
Fort Worth 698,607 11,487 1.64 9
Houston 1,907,150 16,633 .87 13
Austin 578,421 8,482 1.47 7
San Antonio 665,388 10,404 1.56 8
Other 3,046,493 19,384 .64 15
SOURCE: Texas Workforce Commission, Fourth Quarter 1997.
Table 2
North Texas Telecom Firms
Year Function of Dallas Business and Dallas area
arrived Company (origin) area operations product lines in region employment
1978 MCI (U.S.) Engineering Long-distance, wireless, 6,000
headquarters Internet service
1978 Nortel (Canada) U.S. headquarters Manufactures switches, base 8,000
stations, cell phones
1984 Fujitsu (Japan) U.S. headquarters Manufactures switches, 1,700
base stations, other equipment
1985 Ericsson (Sweden) U.S. headquarters Manufactures switches, base 3,000
stations, cell phones, displays
1987 AT&T (U.S.) Regional Long-distance, wireless, 3,350
headquarters Internet service
1987 Excel (U.S.) U.S. headquarters Long-distance service 1,500
1988 GTE (U.S.) Global headquarters Long-distance, local, Internet 14,000
service
1989 Siemens (Germany) Branch Manufactures switches 270
1991 Alcatel (France) U.S. headquarters Manufactures switches, base 5,000
stations, light wave, microwave
1991 SBC (U.S.) Wireless headquarters Local, wireless service 9,000
1992 Nokia (Finland) Branch Manufactures wireless monitors, 3,700
base stations, switches
1995 PrimeCo (U.S.) U.S. headquarters Digital wireless service 1,000
1996 Samsung (Korea) Global headquarters Manufactures cell phones 350
1996 Lucent (U.S.) Branch Manufactures switches, 5,000
base stations
1997 Bosch (Germany) Branch Manufactures switches 175
Total employment 62,045
NOTE: This survey was designed to be comprehensive, though not exhaustive.
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Survey of Telecom Companies, October 1998.Closer to the Competition?
Our survey of telecom companies
and historical accounts of the region in-
dicate three principal reasons compa-
nies have located in and around the
Telecom Corridor. First, firms are drawn
to the area to be near a supplier or 
customer. For example, MCI settled in
Richardson to be near local start-ups
DanRay and Collins Radio, two of its
major suppliers. Second, firms come
into the region through the acquisition
of a local company, such as Nortel
through its purchase of DanRay and Al-
catel through its purchase of Rockwell
International’s Network Transmission
Systems Division (which had acquired
Collins Radio). The final rationale for
choosing North Texas, cited by more re-
cent settlers such as Samsung, is to join
a well-established telecom region.
Preferring to locate close to the com-
petition may sound counterintuitive, 
but high-tech firms have a strong ten-
dency to choose a common location, a
phenomenon known to economists as 
“agglomeration.” Other, more traditional
industries also have a tendency to ag-
glomerate, such as the auto industry in
Detroit and the theater business in New
York. The traditional benefits from lo-
cating close to the competition include
the formation of a highly specialized
labor force (based on the accumulation
of human capital and face-to-face com-
munications), the availability of special-
ized inputs and the existence of modern
infrastructure. High-tech firms enjoy
these benefits from agglomeration as
well. However, high-tech firms also clus-
ter to take advantage of the most im-
portant factor of production in their
industry—namely, ideas.
High levels of research and develop-
ment distinguish high-tech firms, such
as those in North Texas’ telecom-
munications industry, from traditional
manufacturing firms. Innovation in the
telecom industry generates a positive
externality that economists refer to as
“knowledge spillovers.”
4 When one firm
makes an investment to develop a new
product or process, a portion of the
knowledge generated by that invest-
ment may be transmitted, or spill over,
to competitors. This transmission of in-
formation takes place through interac-
tions between customers and suppliers,
by employees moving from one firm to
another, and through informal business
and social interaction among members
of various companies.
Patents diminish the spillovers associ-
ated with an innovation by preventing
competitors from simply copying an in-
vention. The knowledge surrounding
the innovation is much more difficult to
keep proprietary. The closer firms are
geographically, the more likely they are
to benefit from this flow of informa-
tion.
5 In addition to the presence of
plentiful suppliers and customers or the
possibility of specialized financing,
knowledge spillovers drive those North
Texas companies that cite “the exis-
tence of an established network of tele-
com firms” as the primary motivation
for locating in the area.
The knowledge spillovers that drive
telecom agglomeration in North Texas
are similar to those at work in Silicon
Valley.
6 The technical community of 
Silicon Valley is characterized by homo-
geneity of its founders—young, ambi-
tious individuals lacking in industrial
experience and migrating from outside
the region. The level of informal coop-
eration among them was high in the
early days of the region’s development.
They all knew each other and went 
to the same restaurants and bars. They 
collaborated and shared information 
as a technological community, in spite
of being fierce competitors. Numerous
trade associations, industry conferences
and clubs, such as the Homebrew Com-
puter Club, became the center of an in-
formal network. A highly efficient job-
search network was also essential to 
Silicon Valley. When employees moved
between companies, they took with them
the knowledge, skills and experience
acquired at their previous jobs. This 
reinforced a shared technical culture
and accelerated the diffusion of tech-
nological capabilities and know-how.
The region and its network of people
replaced individual firms as the locus of
economic activity.
By locating close to their competi-
tors, telecom firms in North Texas take
advantage of the same type of informal
interaction that generates spillovers in
Silicon Valley. Ideas are shared between
firms and their suppliers, sparking inno-
vations that benefit many other firms in
the immediate area. Recruiting efforts
by large firms (discussed in the follow-
ing section) bring workers to North
Texas. Spillovers from large, established
firms such as GTE and MCI flow to
smaller companies throughout the re-
gion when workers switch jobs and
take their technical skills and training
with them. These benefits from a com-
mon location are less tangible than
things like a common infrastructure and
specialized legal, financial and account-
ing services, but they are no less im-
portant.
Competitors Cooperating?
Knowledge spillovers are an indirect
benefit firms derive from choosing a
common location. North Texas telecom
firms gain direct benefits when they
take advantage of their proximity to 
engage in joint projects that expand the
entire telecom market.
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A Tough Call
Dial, wait, listen, talk, hang up. The
apparent simplicity of an individual phone
call masks the complexity of the hun-
dreds of firms, thousands of workers,
miles of wire and multitude of technolo-
gies constituting the Texas telecommuni-
cations industry.
A complete telephone network relies
on three basic types of equipment. Termi-
nal equipment, such as cell phones and
fax machines, translates your voice or
data into an electronic impulse. Trans-
mission equipment, such as fiber-optic
cables in wired communication or radio
base stations for wireless, carries the im-
pulses from one point to another. Switch-
ing equipment directs traffic within the
system to ensure the impulse reaches the
intended receiver.
The first phone networks were fairly
simple: a stationary phone, cable, and an
operator to mechanically direct the call.
Today, one company supports its half-mil-
lion Dallas cellular phone users with a
network consisting of approximately 250
radio base stations and five switches. The
telecom firms clustered in North Texas
provide the equipment and service that
make these more complex communica-
tions networks possible.Texas at Austin, the University of Texas at
Dallas, Texas A&M University and Texas
Tech University. The consortium will
focus on meeting the employment and
research needs of Texas-based telecom
firms. The Telecom Corridor Technology
Business Council, together with Collin
County Community College and Rich-
land College, received the largest state
Skills Development Fund contract in 
fiscal 1996–97. The $2 million trained
more than 800 computer technicians and
other skilled workers in the Dallas area
(Mt. Joy, 1998).
Companies are cooperating with local
government entities and each other to
expand the region’s international influ-
ence and market share. In August 1994
the Richardson Chamber of Commerce
created the Telecom Corridor Technol-
ogy Business Council, the first such 
organization in Texas. Council objectives
are to influence public issues, coopera-
tively develop programs and services to
expand Telecom Corridor companies,
facilitate communication between exec-
utive peers and create value for the
Telecom Corridor and its competitive
position in the metroplex and the na-
tion. The council’s board of directors is
a prime example of co-opetition. The
board includes presidents and vice
presidents from companies that fiercely
compete for customers, workers and in-
novations. Nevertheless, the executives
cooperate on the council to achieve ob-
jectives that benefit all telecom firms in
the region.
The co-opetition between businesses
has been fostered—not forced—by
local government entities. Ron Robinson,
president and CEO of the Richardson
Economic Development Partnership
that generated the Telecom Corridor
Technology Business Council, explains
government’s role in the region:
The development of the Telecom Cor-
ridor…has been entirely private sector
driven. While some tax incentives
from local government have been pro-
vided and some of the start-ups and
existing companies depend heavily 
on federal contracts, the thrust of 
the entire development has occurred
without public sector stimulation. Local
government has done what it should
do best—provide good government,
superb local services and quality of 
life factors that complement the work-
place. (Robinson, 1995)
The companies concur. None of the
firms surveyed listed preferential tax
treatment as an incentive for locating in
North Texas. Although firms have part-
nered with local government and each
other to promote North Texas’ cluster 
of telecom companies, the industry’s re-
gional development has occurred with
minimal public sector influence.
Fueled by Free Enterprise
The region’s growing telecom indus-
try was made possible by the world-
wide movement toward free enterprise.
Deregulation and privatization have
opened new markets for manufacturers
and service providers and have in-
creased competition to develop the next
technological innovations.
The North Texas telecommunications
industry took off after the Department
of Justice and AT&T negotiated a com-
plex restructuring in the early 1980s.
The AT&T manufacturing and service
monopoly—long supported by federal,
state and local regulators who thought
competition would result in inferior ser-
vice—was divided into several local
service providers, like Southwestern Bell,
and one long-distance provider, AT&T.
As the U.S. market opened, competing
equipment manufacturers and service
providers located in North Texas, join-
ing MCI and its suppliers.
Global telecom privatizations have
also benefited the North Texas telecom
industry. Alcatel, created by the 1987
French telecom privatization, came to
Richardson in 1991 after acquiring a
supplier to MCI. MCI, whose engineer-
ing division is headquartered in North
Texas, acquired Brazil’s long-distance
service in 1998 through one of the
largest privatization transactions ever.
Increased competition and larger mar-
kets have encouraged North Texas firms
to develop new transmission, switching
and terminal equipment technologies
and new services. Richardson start-up
Optical Switch Corporation just an-
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Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996)
coined the term “co-opetition” to de-
scribe when firms cooperate to expand
an industry’s market size while still
competing for market share. Traditional
economic analysis assumes a profit-
maximizing firm can gain only at the ex-
pense of the competition. Co-opetition
considers situations where firms engage
in win-win strategies for themselves and
their competitors. Examples of co-opeti-
tion include research joint ventures,
government lobbying efforts by many
firms in an industry, and industry (rather
than firm-specific) advertising cam-
paigns. Texas’ telecom firms engage in
co-opetition when they jointly work to
expand their labor market and extend
their global influence.
The telecom industry has an insa-
tiable appetite for skilled workers, so
North Texas telecom firms are cooper-
ating to attract new workers and train
regional residents for telecom jobs. To
make it easier for job seekers to find out
about the region and its opportunities,
area companies launched the “eJobs-
Telecom Corridor Program” Web site.
The Internet resource features links to
Web sites of more than 130 companies
through an alphabetical listing; it avoids
pushing one company over another by
beginning each day at a different letter
of the alphabet. Information about the
region’s housing, cost of living, climate,
recreation and even shopping is also 
included. By clicking on the “submit re-
sume” button, a job seeker can elec-
tronically send a resume to one, six or
all of the companies. Through August
1998, 19,000 job seekers had sent
27,000 resumes to 121 companies using
the eJobs Web site.
Qualified people are more likely to
risk moving to a new area if they have
more than one job opportunity. Regard-
less of which company initially hires a
worker, other area firms will benefit from
the knowledge the worker acquires at
the first firm, should that worker ever
switch companies.
Firms are also cooperating with local
universities and community colleges to
train new workers. Companies includ-
ing TI, Motorola, SBC and AT&T have
each committed $100,000 per year for
the next five years to form an educa-
tional consortium with the University of (Continued on page 12)UCH HAS BEEN written re-
cently about whether the
economy is growing “too fast”
and whether the unemploy-
ment rate is “too low.” Using
jargon such as the “natural
rate” of unemployment and the “NAIRU,”
pundits point to the low unemployment
rate as evidence the United States is on
an unsustainable economic course. To
use an analogy, a person can sprint for
a quarter mile, but the physical laws of
nature make it impossible to do so for a
marathon. Similarly, the argument goes,
the current U.S. rate of unemployment
is lower than the economic laws of 
nature will permit, and it cannot remain
at this level without dire consequences
for the economy.
Yet, by historical standards, the U.S.
unemployment rate is not particularly
low. As Chart 1 illustrates, unemploy-
ment routinely fell below its current rate
during the 1950s and 1960s. Analysts
cite a variety of factors to explain its
subsequent upward drift, including de-
mographic changes, increased labor-
market regulation, a decline in the
quality of education and a rise in female
labor-market participation. The trend re-
versed itself in more recent times, with
unemployment rates falling to levels
more reminiscent of the 1950s than the
1970s. Faced with this decline, econo-
mists have lowered a benchmark esti-
mate of sustainable unemployment
from 6 percent to 5.5 percent. But is 5.5
percent low enough?
This article examines several factors
unique to the 1990s that mark the onset
of a “new economy,” one fundamen-
tally different from that of the 1970s 
and 1980s—and better able to sustain
low rates of unemployment. To do so, 
I examine three questions. First, why
might we think that unemployment is
too low? Second, why should we be
concerned about low unemployment?
And third, has the nature of unemploy-
ment changed in such a way that un-
employment rates that would have
been too low a decade ago are now
possible to sustain over the long run
without prompting inflation?
A Closer Look at Unemployment
Several factors contribute to unem-
ployment in a market economy. The
first of these is the constant process of
“creative destruction,” in which old
firms are destroyed and new firms are
created. These changes sometimes
occur within a particular industry as un-
competitive firms downsize in an at-
tempt to become more efficient or
when they go out of business and are
replaced by more competitive firms.
Shifts from one industry to another are
also important, as the decline of the
American automobile industry and the
rise of the computer industry illustrate.
In each case, the normal workings of
the economy caused labor turnover.
Therefore, even a perfect world in
which everyone could work at a desir-
able job would have at least a small
amount of unemployment.
In the imperfect world in which we
live, several other factors also con-
tribute to unemployment. One is the
degree to which able-bodied individu-
als have an incentive to work. Opinions
on this topic vary widely and are some-
times controversial, but there is little
doubt that at least a small number of
people do not seek work as eagerly as
they could. Some studies have found
government welfare programs exacer-
bate this problem by lessening the con-
sequences of unemployment. In any
event, the unemployment rate is likely
higher than it could be if everyone were
highly motivated to seek work.
The job-search process can also be
costly. When unemployed individuals
must spend a great deal of time looking
for work, or when firms must spend a
great deal of time searching for appli-
cants, unemployment will be higher than
it would be if people could find jobs
more quickly and easily. Technology
that reduces job-search time at either
end—people finding firms or firms find-
ing people—can reduce the amount of
time individuals must look for work and
thereby reduce the number of people
unemployed at any given time.
Finally, different individuals have dif-
ferent abilities to work. Through no
fault of their own, some people have
physical or mental impairments that do
not affect their desire to work but may
affect their capacity to work. To the 
extent that companies cannot easily 
accommodate their needs in the work-
place, people with disabilities face 
special obstacles in the job-search
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SOURCE: Board of Governors database.process that lengthen the time they
must spend seeking work. This makes
the unemployment rate higher than it
could be if ways were found for these
individuals to perform work more eas-
ily. In an era characterized by height-
ened sensitivity to the physically and
mentally challenged, it is especially im-
portant to acknowledge this issue and
examine the extent to which it has been
mitigated by the new economy of the
1990s.
Why We Should Care About 
Low Unemployment
Given that some unemployment is to
be expected even under the best of cir-
cumstances, it is natural to ask how low
the unemployment rate can go before
becoming unsustainable. Until the late
1960s, most economists estimated this
“natural rate” of unemployment to be
approximately 4 percent.
1 Rising unem-
ployment in the 1970s convinced many
that the natural rate had gone up to 6
percent, while the economic boom of
the 1990s recently led the federal gov-
ernment to lower its estimate of the 
natural rate to 5.5 percent.
2 However,
U.S. unemployment now stands a full
point below the level deemed unsus-
tainable, and it has remained below 5.5
percent for each of the past three years.
Should we be concerned?
When the unemployment rate is un-
usually low, firms must offer higher
wages to attract workers. This may seem
beneficial for everyone, but these wage
increases are not accompanied by any
increase in productivity. The only way
companies can pay higher wages for
the same output is to raise prices, which
causes inflation. Indeed, it was this con-
cern that prompted economists to coin
the acronym NAIRU—nonaccelerating
inflation rate of unemployment—and
later suggest that the current 4.6 percent
rate of unemployment is unsustainable.
Anyone who remembers the state of
the economy during the Carter admin-
istration understands the damage in-
flation can cause.
3 Products suddenly
become more expensive, but savings
account balances do not magically rise
to compensate. And when the infla-
tion rate is both high and erratic, as 
occurred during the Carter years, people
tend to spend their salaries immediately
rather than save them because the next
month’s inflation could be even higher.
This lack of saving hinders banks’ abil-
ity to make loans and thereby hinders
entrepreneurs’ access to capital, which
reduces economic growth and can even
cause a recession.
Historically, the Fed is seen as raising
interest rates when unemployment is
deemed too low in order to slow eco-
nomic growth and reduce inflationary
pressures. Chart 2 plots unemployment
and inflation during the 1985–94 period
and suggests that low unemployment
was generally accompanied by high in-
flation. If the American economy were
behaving in 1998 as it did then, the cur-
rent 4.6 percent rate of unemployment
would be accompanied by an inflation
rate of almost 5 percent and the current
1.6 percent rate of inflation would pro-
duce an unemployment rate of almost 9
percent. If the so-called Phillips curve
depicted in Chart 2 were an immutable
law of economics, the current rate of
unemployment would provoke grave
concern about inflationary pressures.
But something is different now. The
low unemployment of the late 1990s
has been accompanied by extraordi-
narily low inflation, as Chart 2 illus-
trates. While it was fashionable in the
early months of below-5 percent unem-
ployment to predict inflation was about
to surface, it now appears something in
the American economy has changed.
What was thought to be “unsustainable”
in the past now appears sustainable.
But what is different about the 1990s?
Changes to the Welfare System
The American welfare system, begun
in 1936, was designed to help destitute
individuals survive the Great Depres-
sion. From this laudable goal sprang
hundreds of programs to help the
needy, from food stamps to Medicaid to
a myriad of smaller programs. And what
could be wrong with trying to improve
the well-being of the poor?
The problem with welfare programs
was best captured by Joseph Schum-
peter when he said the real tragedy of
unemployment is not lack of employ-
ment per se but “unemployment plus
the impossibility of providing adequately
for the unemployed without impair-
ing the conditions of further economic 
development.”
4 When the government
helps those who do not work, it in-
evitably creates an incentive for others
to collect welfare instead of going to
work. Economic research is divided on
how large these effects can be, but the
basic point remains: there is no way to
help the poor without encouraging at
least a small number of people to be-
come poor. When people who could
work decide to join the welfare rolls,
economic output must fall because
fewer workers are available to produce
it. Hence Schumpeter’s discouraging
conclusion that welfare programs harm
the economy.
In 1996 President Clinton signed a
welfare-reform bill designed to assist
those who need it but end assistance to
those who do not. The legislation im-
posed a five-year lifetime limit on wel-
fare recipiency. It also mandated that no
one could receive welfare for more than
two years without doing something—
such as attending classes or participat-
ing in government-run jobs programs
—in exchange. Shortly before its pas-
sage, the bill’s opponents complained
bitterly that welfare reform would sim-
ply “punish those least able to cope,”
5
but data from the past few years tell a
different story. As Chart 3 illustrates,
welfare recipiency has fallen dramati-




























SOURCE: Board of Governors database.cally, beginning at approximately the
time when it appeared welfare reform
might be enacted into law and continu-
ing into late 1998. This decline is not
limited to any particular region of the
United States; indeed, the number of
people receiving welfare benefits has
fallen in every state except Hawaii. This
broad-based decline in welfare recipi-
ency is entirely consistent with a “new
economy.”
Some have argued the unprece-
dented drop in welfare recipiency is
due solely to the booming economy. To
shed light on this view, Chart 4 shows
GDP and welfare recipiency growth
rates during each business cycle since
1950. Remarkably, the current cycle’s
growth rate of 2.26 percent is the low-
est in the postwar era while its decline
in welfare rolls is the highest of the
postwar era. More telling is that the
strongest economic expansion occurred
at precisely the time welfare recipiency
increased most—the years surrounding
the Great Society of the 1960s. Since
welfare recipiency did not fall during
the impressive expansions of the past,
there is little reason to believe the rela-
tively mild expansion of the 1990s is 
responsible for the current unprece-
dented decline in welfare recipiency.
Why could changes to the welfare
system reduce unemployment? As was
discussed above, unemployment is de-
termined in part by the job search costs
individuals face and by how much in-
centive they have to find work. When
an alternative source of income (such as
welfare) is available to anyone for as
long as they are unemployed, there is
less incentive to find work as quickly as
possible. On the other hand, when the
alternative to work becomes less gen-
erous, people who are unemployed
have a greater incentive to find new
jobs quickly. This both lowers the un-
employment rate and reduces the nat-
ural rate of unemployment.
Advances in Computer and 
Communications Technology
Much has been written about the so-
called digital divide, which separates
computer-savvy individuals from others.
Those who understand computers will
prosper, the theory goes, while those
who do not will lack the most basic
skills needed to work in the information
age.
6 This theory makes sense in certain
circumstances, but it misses two features
of the information age that make the
workplace more accessible to everyone:
a reduction in job-search costs and an in-
crease in opportunities for the disabled.
One signature feature of the informa-
tion age is the ability to instantly search
help-wanted ads from across the country
and make resumes available to employ-
ers in all parts of the nation. Until re-
cently, individuals often searched for
work by traveling from city to city or
spending hours in a library perusing a
few major newspapers. Today, anyone
with access to the Internet can instantly
search job listings from around the
country. Thousands of companies now
post their help-wanted ads on the Inter-
net, and there are more than 200 Inter-
net sites at which job seekers can check
job listings or post resumes. The box
entitled “Job-Search Sites on the Web”
lists a sampling of these sites.
Help-wanted ads in cyberspace would
not mean much if ordinary people did
not use the Internet daily. As Chart 5 in-
dicates, however, Internet use has
soared from essentially zero in 1991 to
35 percent of the population today. In
fact, it is estimated that more than 3 
million people use the Internet to look
for work on any given day.
7 And as the
Internet becomes available through
television sets and other devices, even
those who know nothing about operat-
ing a computer will be able to surf the
Web for information. The box entitled
“Comments from Online Job-Seekers”
contains anecdotes from ordinary people
who used these sites to find jobs quickly
and easily.
Advances in computer technology
also enable those with special needs to
find jobs more quickly. Indeed, tech-
nological advances have historically
helped enable the physically and men-
tally challenged to become more pro-
ductive and employable. Those who
lack the strength to carry cargo on their
backs or lack the experience with ani-
mals to haul it via horses can load it
into a truck using a cargo mover and
then drive it to its ultimate destination.
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Chart 4
GDP and Welfare Growth
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SOURCE: Administration for Children and Families 
(part of the Department of Health and 
Human Services).
SOURCE: Administration for Children and Families 
(part of the Department of Health and 
Human Services).
SOURCE: Adapted from Federal Reserve Bank of
Dallas 1996 Annual Report.Conclusion
For the past several years, the Ameri-
can unemployment rate has been lower
than many analysts thought possible yet
has not triggered the inflation many 
analysts regarded as inevitable. This 
article suggests that welfare reform and
information-age technologies may have
fundamentally changed the American
economy, so that unemployment rates
deemed low by the standards of the
1970s and 1980s can be maintained
without creating inflationary pressures.
This does not mean there is no longer
any unemployment rate below which
inflation is likely to occur, nor does it
mean the Fed should stop watching for
signs of inflation. It does mean that
changes in technology and government
policy are important contributors to low
unemployment and that recent changes
in these areas are likely at least partially
responsible for the remarkably low rate
of unemployment in the American
economy today.
—Jason Saving s Notes
The author thanks Mike Cox for his helpful observations and Ricardo
Llaudes for his research assistance.
1 Economists use two similar concepts when discussing unsustain-
able unemployment: the natural rate of unemployment (the rate that
would hold if all markets functioned optimally) and the NAIRU (the
lowest rate of unemployment consistent with stable inflation).
2 1998 Economic Report of the President.
3 The late 1970s were also characterized by high unemployment.
4 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New
York, Harper, 1950).
5 Former Sen. Bill Bradley of New Jersey, as quoted in “President
Praises Senate Changes in Welfare-Reform Bill,” Morning Edition,
National Public Radio, July 24, 1996.
6 Anna Bray Duff, “Does U.S. Face a ‘Digital Divide’? Battle of Haves
Vs. Have-Nots Goes High-Tech,” Investor’s Business Daily, August
14, 1998, p. A1.
7 Daniel Levine, “Your Dream Job: A Click Away,” Reader’s Digest, 
October 1998, p. 114.
8 The state of the art in this area is a computer chip that enables users
to manipulate physical objects with their minds. Should future 
scientific research prove fruitful, there may come a time in which
people with any form of physical disability can work as efficiently as
those without. See Warren King, “New Implant Allows Disabled to
‘Will’ Computer Functions,” Dallas Morning News, October 11,
1998, p. A13.
Those who lack the manual dexterity to
sew can set up a sewing machine and
produce clothes. There are many other
examples of how machinery has helped
reduce the need for physical skills, and,
in each case, people who previously
lacked the requisite qualifications to
work suddenly became as employable
as those whose arms were strong or
whose fingers were nimble.
In the information age, technological
advances have enabled physically and
mentally challenged individuals whose
lives were largely unassisted by the in-
ventions of the industrial age to be as
productive as other employees. One ex-
ample of this is in the fast-food indus-
try, where workers can take orders from
customers without knowing how to add
or even how to read; workers simply
touch computer-generated pictures of
food items to relay an order to the
kitchen. And with the advent of voice-
recognition technology, even people
born with severe physical disabilities
are no longer excluded from the bene-
fits of computers.
8
Computers and the Internet affect the
unemployment rate by shortening the
time people spend looking for work
and increasing the ability of physically
and mentally challenged individuals to
find jobs. In the past, individuals with
special needs might have had to search
a very long time until they found a job
they could perform unassisted, and any-
one who could not find a job in his or
her own city might have had to spend
weeks or even months drifting from
one place to another in search of work.
In the information age, however, the
disabled can (with the help of technol-
ogy) perform almost any job as well as
and sometimes better than the non-
disabled, and it is not uncommon for
people to find jobs for which they are
well-suited within a matter of days by
searching the Internet. This dramatically
cuts the time unemployed people must
spend searching for work and thereby
reduces the rate of unemployment.
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Comments from 
Online Job-Seekers
“Who would have ever thought that I
would land a career within my major two
months prior to graduating from college?
I received over twenty responses within
just one week after putting my resume on-
line.” —Anonymous, Job Link USA
“I was in the middle of making a transition
from New York to California after my hus-
band’s company relocated. That’s when I
decided to try [the Web site] Job Link
USA. Job Link USA sent my resume to
thirty companies prior to my relocation.
Thanks to Job Link USA I was hired the
next week.” —Anonymous, Job Link USA
“I found an interesting job posting on the
Monster Board [Web site] and in less than
a week had the job of my life!!! This was
the EASIEST I have ever found employ-
ment and will recommend it to everyone
looking for their perfect job!” —Kim
Porcher, Monster Board
“Within 3 days [after posting resume on
Web], I received a call from a prospective
employer. A week later I was interviewing
at their company headquarters in Boston,
and two weeks later...received a job offer
for moving to San Francisco.” —Babak
Ardalan, Monster Board Job-Search Sites on the Web
Here are 24 of the numerous Internet


























CareerSite www.careersite.comKEPTICS DOUBTED THAT the
politically and culturally diverse
nations in the European Union
(EU) could ever set aside their
differences and unite to form 
a single currency. However, in 
the 10-year span since the Delors Re-
port
1 proposed the idea, the economic
and monetary union (EMU) has gone
from concept to reality for the EU11, as
the EMU countries have come to be
known.
2 On January 1, 1999, the EU11
will hand over control of their money
supplies to the European Central Bank,
and in 2002 the euro—the region’s new
currency—will officially replace the
local currencies.
While the coming of the euro is now
a certainty, it is yet to be decided how
much, if at all, the euro-zone countries
will benefit from the single currency,
what the risk of failure is and what im-
plications the union has for the United
States.
Benefits to Monetary Union
The motivation behind the EMU may
be more political than economic, and
many see it as merely the next step 
toward a more integrated Europe. How-
ever, adoption of the euro does have
some important economic implications
and might provide some economic 
benefit to the participating countries.
One aim of moving to the single cur-
rency is to foster trade not only among
the EU11, but also between the EU11
and other countries. Currently, for a
German company to purchase goods
from France, it would first need to con-
vert Deutsche marks into francs. This
poses two problems for the German
company. Not only will it incur transac-
tion costs in the conversion, but it also
faces the risk that the francs will decline
in value once they are purchased. The
single currency will virtually eliminate
these two problems. Similarly, a firm
from a country outside the EU11 would
only need to convert its domestic cur-
rency into euros to do business with
any of the 11 countries.
Another potential benefit of the mone-
tary union relates to the business cycles
of the member countries. As the euro-
zone countries’ economies become more
integrated and the factors of production
become more mobile, business cycle
swings may become less pronounced
and more correlated between countries.
At the moment in Europe, most of
such business cycle smoothing occurs
not between countries but within a
country, where people insulate them-
selves from large changes in consump-
tion by saving more in good times and
less during bad times.
3 If the EMU suc-
ceeds in making capital more mobile
through lower transaction costs and less
currency risk, then more risk sharing
will occur between countries as cross-
ownership of assets increases. If, how-
ever, capital movement across borders
is being restrained not by transaction
costs and currency risk but by informa-
tional barriers, then capital movement
might not increase that much and busi-
ness cycle smoothing will not occur to
as great an extent. This is potentially the
biggest risk the union faces.
The Business Cycle and 
Potential for Failure
Most of the concerns about the long-
term viability of the EMU stem from one
basic problem: the countries in the
union are often at different points in the
business cycle, which means that one
country might enter into a recession at
the same time the other countries are ex-
panding. Under the EMU, that country
would not have monetary policy at its
disposal to lift its economy out of re-
cession, nor would it be able to devalue
its currency to increase demand for 
its products abroad. In the worst-case 
scenario, if the other countries are ex-
periencing inflation, they may even
vote to increase interest rates at a time
when a rate cut is most needed by the
stagnating country.
In the United States, when one area
of the country goes into recession, such
as Texas after the 1986 oil-price shock
or California in the early 1990s, the U.S.
government can use fiscal policy to 
redistribute income to the suffering re-
gion. Also, labor is very mobile be-
tween regions, and workers can move
rather easily to a healthier area of the
country.
The EMU, however, has no central
fiscal authority, and cultural differences
and labor market issues make workers
far less mobile than in the United States.
It appears that the only way to insulate
EMU countries from adverse economic
shocks is through increased capital mo-
bility. As mentioned earlier, however, it
is far from certain that capital flows will
increase significantly. A possible solu-
tion would be to allow governments to
temporarily run large budget deficits
during rough economic times. Under the
current agreement, however, they would
not be allowed to do so.
4
While unemployment in the region
has been declining, the euro-zone un-
employment rate still stands at 11.1 per-
cent (Chart 1). Pressures could mount
on the central bank to use monetary
policy to alleviate unemployment at 
the expense of higher inflation, and the 
disparity in the rates between countries
could cause a political rift between high-
and low-unemployment countries.
EU leaders are already pressing for
lower interest rates, even ahead of the
date the European Central Bank starts
setting monetary policy.
5 Many feel that
European interest rates should converge
to the level of the securities repurchase
rate in France and Germany of 3.3 per-
cent—currently the lowest of any of the
EU11—or perhaps even lower. Such a
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Page  9
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Sconvergence would represent a 0.5 per-
cent cut for the region as a whole.
If the European Central Bank fails to
cut rates while the U.S. interest rate
continues to fall, the dollar could ex-
tend its decline against the European
countries and the euro might become
too strong. This could slow growth for
the EU11 and create a conflict between
those countries that are export depen-
dent and those that are import depen-
dent. Also, the EMU could be seen as
not playing its part in alleviating the
global financial crisis.
Implications for the United States
Once in place, the EU11 will rep-
resent one of the world’s largest mar-
kets, rivaling the United States in size
(Table 1). The EMU’s success or failure
could have significant implications for
the United States, and a strong EMU
could be very beneficial. If the mone-
tary union strengthens the economies of
the EU11, it will create a larger market
for U.S. products. Having the single 
currency will also make it easier for 
U.S. companies that wish to do business
in Europe.
A successful euro won’t necessarily
benefit everyone, however. U.S. ex-
porters could see some drop-off in 
demand for their products as the euro-
zone countries trade more among them-
selves. As it stands now, 35.2 percent 
of EU11 trade is with other EU11 coun-
tries. That figure should increase once
the monetary union goes into effect.
Furthermore, international holdings
of dollars will inevitably drop as a result
of the union, particularly if the euro is
widely held as a reserve currency. First
of all, the demand for dollars from the
EU11 will decline because they will no
longer need to stabilize the value of
their own currencies versus those of 
the other EU11 countries. Moreover, if
countries outside the EMU find that
euros are cheaper to acquire and easier
to use in transactions, then the euro
could gain ground on the dollar as the
currency of choice in international re-
serves. However, because the dollar 
has a strong history as a store of value
and is so widely used and accepted, it
is unlikely that it will be supplanted as
the preferred reserve currency any time
soon.
Conclusion
While politics has to this point been
the main driving force behind the Euro-
pean monetary unification, political rifts
could also be what one day spell the
end of the EMU. The political momen-
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tum that has carried it this far will likely
help it through tough times in the near
future; however, a long period of sus-
tained unemployment or low output
growth could lead to a weakening of
the union. If transaction costs and cur-
rency risk under the current system do
not restrain trade and capital movement
to a great extent and the EMU fails to
bring the business cycles of the EU11 in
line, then the benefits from the union
would be small.
On the other hand, the union could
be a boon to trade as transactions be-
come more efficient and the countries
of Europe reach a new level of eco-
nomic and political cooperation. Only
time will tell what the actual outcome
will be.
—Justin Marion s Notes
1 See Jacques Delors et al., Report on Economic and Monetary Union
in the European Community (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publi-
cations of the European Communities, 1989).
2 The EMU consists of Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. Greece
has not yet met the criteria for membership, but will probably join by
the year 2002.
3 See Bent E. Sørensen and Oved Yosha, “International Risk Sharing
and European Monetary Unification,” Journal of International Eco-
nomics 45, no. 2, August 1998, pp. 211–38. The authors find that
among European Community countries, 40 percent of GDP shocks
are smoothed at the one-year frequency, with half of that smoothing
attributed to corporate saving and the other half to government
deficits.
4 The Stability and Growth Pact, signed in 1996, will impose fairly 
severe fines on EMU countries that have government budget deficits
exceeding 3 percent of GDP.
5 At a recent European Union summit, EU leaders joined in calling for
lower interest rates among the EU countries. Italian Prime Minister
Massimo D’Alema said, “There is no doubt the hope is for a general
reduction in interest rates, starting with Germany.”Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Page  11
Further Information 
on the Data
For more information on employment
data, see “Reassessing Texas Employment
Growth” (Southwest Economy, July/August
1993). For TIPI, see “The Texas Industrial 
Production Index” (Dallas Fed Economic 
Review, November 1989). For the Texas
Leading Index and its components, see 
“The Texas Index of Leading Indicators: 
A Revision and Further Evaluation” (Dallas
Fed  Economic Review, July 1990).
Online economic data and articles are
available on the Dallas Fed’s Internet Web
site, www.dallasfed.org.
Thousands of persons Index, 1987 = 100 July–September 1998
Texas Leading Index and Nonfarm Employment Net Contributions of Components to Change in Leading Index
Texas Industrial Production Index
Index, January 1995 = 100
Total Nonfarm Employment
Index, January 1995 = 100
Percent
.40 –1.20 –1.00 –.80 –.60 –.40 –.20 0 .20
Average weekly hours –1.00
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HE TEXAS ECONOMY continues to outpace the na-
tion, in spite of being hit with a severe drought, de-
clining exports and downturns in the semiconductor
and energy industries. Texas employment grew at a
3.2 percent annual rate in the third quarter, compared
with a 1.9 percent increase for the United States. Be-
hind this healthy growth is a thriving service-producing sec-
tor, which has partially offset declines in other areas such as
manufacturing and energy-related employment. While still
sound, employment growth has been trending downward
from the strong 4.6 percent increase seen in 1997.
The Texas Leading Index, which has been signaling slower
growth since May, fell more sharply in August and September.
Weakness was evident across most categories. Low oil prices
and declining well permits have been chipping away at the
index for most of the year as the energy industry continues 
to lay off workers. Also dampening the outlook has been an 
T
Regional Economic Indicators
Texas employment* Total nonfarm employment*
Texas Private
Leading TIPI** Construc- Manufac- Govern- service- New
Index total Mining tion turing ment producing Texas Louisiana Mexico
9/98 119.9 128.7 168.4 492.6 1,109.9 1,514.3 5,693.7 8,978.9 1,885.6 721.7
8/98 120.5 129.4 169.7 493.6 1,108.0 1,503.4 5,678.1 8,952.8 1,886.1 720.9
7/98 123.1 129.8 170.3 491.3 1,105.7 1,498.4 5,664.2 8,929.9 1,891.0 720.4
6/98 123.4 129.7 170.8 489.4 1,108.1 1,494.9 5,646.1 8,909.3 1,890.4 718.1
5/98 124.6 130.0 170.8 488.2 1,108.1 1,495.5 5,637.1 8,899.7 1,887.2 716.8
4/98 124.6 128.6 171.1 485.9 1,107.1 1,495.8 5,619.5 8,879.4 1,884.4 716.0
3/98 124.3 129.1 171.1 483.4 1,106.7 1,493.2 5,607.6 8,862.0 1,883.7 714.8
2/98 124.9 128.9 171.1 482.2 1,104.7 1,490.9 5,587.9 8,836.8 1,882.5 714.1
1/98 123.9 128.9 170.3 477.7 1,104.5 1,490.2 5,568.6 8,811.3 1,878.7 714.1
12/97 123.2 128.8 171.2 472.4 1,097.2 1,488.1 5,546.2 8,775.1 1,866.2 713.1
11/97 123.9 128.4 170.6 470.0 1,093.2 1,482.6 5,524.5 8,740.9 1,863.7 712.3
10/97 124.5 128.8 169.8 468.5 1,090.1 1,479.7 5,505.8 8,713.9 1,862.5 711.5
* in thousands
** Texas Industrial Production Index
appreciating dollar compared with the currencies of Texas’
major trading partners. This will further slow Texas exports,
which declined 4.2 percent in the first half of 1998.
The construction sector has been a continuing bright spot
for the Texas economy. Low interest rates have fueled a boom
in nonresidential and residential construction. Construction con-
tract values for the first nine months were 18 percent higher
than a year ago. Backlogs in new home building will feed 
activity in coming months, but some industry contacts have
seen a slight decrease in home sales growth. Also, a slight rise
in office vacancy rates and stabilization of rent increases have
slowed financing of new projects. However, nonbuilding con-
struction—primarily of roads—has risen in 1998 and should













nounced an optical switching device
it claims may be the missing link in
making the network of the future a
reality. Southwestern Bell recently
launched digital cellular phone ser-
vice that also provides customized
news updates.
By promoting freer telecom-
munications markets, governments
have enabled businesses to choose
the locations, customers and sup-
pliers that best suit them. Contin-
ued privatization and deregulation,
along with agglomeration and 
co-opetition, will leave the North
Texas telecom industry well poised
to compete in the 21st century.
— Marci Rossell
Meredith Walker s Notes
1 The American Electronics Association uses 45 Standard 
Industrial Codes (SIC) to define high-tech, including high-
tech manufacturing, software and computer-related ser-
vices, and communications services. Because they exclude
biotechnology, research and development services, etc.,
these high-tech employment figures are conservative.
2 For our purposes, the telecommunications industry is de-
fined by SIC 366 (Telephone and Telegraph Apparatus;
Radio and Television Broadcasting and Communication
Equipment; Other Communications Equipment) and 481
(Radiotelephone Communications and Telephone Commu-
nications, Except Radiotelephone).
3 Source: Richardson Chamber of Commerce.
4 For a survey of the literature on spillovers, see Griliches
(1992).
5 Jaffe, Trajtenberg and Henderson (1993) provide empirical
evidence of the extent to which knowledge spillovers are lo-
calized.
6 See Saxenian (1994) for a description of Silicon Valley’s de-
velopment.
References
Brandenburger, Adam, and Barry Nalebuff (1996), Co-opeti-
tion (New York: Currency Doubleday).
Griliches, Zvi (1992), “The Search for R&D Spillovers,” NBER
Working Paper Series, no. 3768 (Cambridge, Mass.: National
Bureau of Economic Research, November).
Jaffe, Adam, Manuel Trajtenberg and Rebecca Henderson
(1993), “Geographic Localization of Knowledge Spillovers as
Evidenced by Patent Citations,” Quarterly Journal of Econom-
ics 108 (August): 577–98.
Mt. Joy, Greg (1998), “Tech Workers for Tomorrow,” Fiscal
Notes, Texas Comptroller’s Office (August).
Robinson, Ron (1995), “The Telecom Corridor,” Commentary,
Richardson Chamber of Commerce (Winter), 31–37.
Saxenian, A. (1994), Regional Advantage: Culture and Com-
petition in Silicon Valley and Route 128 (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press).
TELECOMINNORTHTEXAS









Jennifer Afflerbach, Monica Reeves
Design & Production
Laura J. Bell
Southwest Economy is published 
six times annually by the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
The views expressed are those of the 
authors and should not be attributed to 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 
or the Federal Reserve System.
Articles may be reprinted on the condition 
that the source is credited and a copy is 
provided to the Research Department 
of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
Southwest Economy is available free of charge 
by writing the Public Affairs Department, 
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, 
P.O. Box 655906, Dallas, TX 75265-5906, 
or by telephoning (214) 922-5254.
s